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Abstract
We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two industry lobbies can seek a laxer policy
that would apply to both industries and loophole lobbying that provides benefits specific to one industry.
We determine the properties of the lobbying equilibrium, including the resulting emissions level. In
many cases, higher effectiveness of loophole lobbying is detrimental for industries and beneficial for
environmental quality, as it exacerbates the free-rider problem in the provision of general lobbying by
inducing industries to turn towards loophole lobbying.
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1 Introduction
Representatives of polluting industries usually want environmental policy
to be lax, but have diﬀerent preferences about how to distribute the bur-
den of any legally required emissions reduction among them. For instance,
economy-wide energy taxes can be designed in diﬀerent ways, with various
kinds of sectoral exemptions. A case in point is the German eco tax, which
contains many explicit or implicit loopholes for particular industries.1 At
first glance, the freedom of policy makers to grant such loopholes would ap-
pear to be disadvantageous for the environment. However, this is less clear
if environmental policy is endogenously influenced by the lobbying activities
of interest groups.
We shall propose that, when an environmental policy can be implemented
in many diﬀerent ways with diﬀerent distributional implications for the af-
fected industries, the political-influence activities of each industry will be di-
verted from resisting regulation as such towards lobbying for industry-specific
loopholes. As a result, when there is considerable scope for loopholes, the
equilibrium policy may be stricter than when there is not. Intuitively, greater
scope for loopholes means that the incentive for free-riding on other industry
lobbies in the resistance to regulation is larger.
We make this argument more precise in a model with two lobbies, each
of which represents an industry. An industry lobby has two instruments to
influence the tax it faces, general lobbying and loophole lobbying. These ac-
tivities translate into industry taxes by means of a policy formation function
with the following properties. First, total general lobbying of the two in-
dustries determines a base level of the tax that is an upper bound for both
industry taxes; higher general lobbying corresponds to lower taxes. By defi-
nition, therefore, general lobbying is a public good from the point of view of
1Apart from a preferential treatment of the manufacturing industry as opposed to
the service industry, the Eco Tax contains a complicated set of special regulations which
amount to loopholes for specific sectors (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 1999, Chapt. 1, Tab.
1, Bundesumweltministerium, 2002).
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the industries. As such, it is prone to underprovision. Second, by definition,
loophole lobbying of an industry only reduces the tax for this particular in-
dustry, as it reflects eﬀorts to gain tax exemptions. The eﬀect of loophole
lobbying on the other industry is assumed to be at best neutral, but typically
negative: The more the other industry lobbies for favors, the more eﬀort is
required by a group to obtain similar concessions.2
Each industry is imperfectly competitive with constant marginal costs, in-
cluding an output-dependent environmental tax. The industry profit, gross
of lobbying costs, is a decreasing function of marginal costs. Therefore, an
industry’s gross profits are an increasing function of total general lobbying
and of its own loophole lobbying, but a non-increasing function of the com-
peting group’s loophole lobbying. Industry lobbies simultaneously choose
general lobbying and loophole lobbying expenditures so as to maximize in-
dustry profits, net of lobbying expenditures. An exogenous parameter θ
measures the scope for loophole lobbying. For given levels of each type of
lobbying, higher values of this parameter mean that loopholes for each indus-
try increase and thus taxes decrease. Also, the absolute value of the marginal
eﬀect of loophole lobbying on taxes is higher.
In this setting, our central point is as follows: Because of strategic inter-
actions, greater scope for loopholes may lead to an equilibrium that involves
higher environmental taxes and less pollution. Industry groups that both
expect loophole lobbying to be eﬀective will tend to focus on this kind of ac-
tivity, rather than on general lobbying against environmental regulation. The
tendency for underprovision of general lobbying as a public good is enhanced
by the existence of the alternative, loophole lobbying. Thus, somewhat para-
doxically, greater eﬀectiveness of loophole lobbying may well be detrimental
to lobbyists - and beneficial to the environment.
2Both types of lobbying can take various forms: information campaigns, legal or il-
legal contribution payments, or the promise of cooperation in other policy areas. Very
roughly, one would expect loophole lobbying to be more secretive: The smaller the group
in society whose interests the lobbying activities represents, the less likely it is that public
information campaigns will receive much public attention.
2
Lobbyists are aware of the conflict between general lobbying and loophole
lobbying. For instance, in a recent press release the German Auto Industry
Association VDA demanded a common stance of the VDA and the Logis-
tics Industry Association BGL against a heavy vehicle charge rather than
“speculation about possible distributive eﬀects of the charge” (VDA 2002).
More generally, industry associations are typically members of higher level
associations that deal with general lobbying. For instance, the press releases
of the German BDI usually concern general topics like climate policy, water
policy or even abstract concepts such as the precautionary principle.3 The
associations can therefore be interpreted as an institutional answer to the
problem of excessive loophole lobbying.4
Our paper has some bearing on a central question of positive environ-
mental economics, namely, what kind of regulation is likely to emerge as the
outcome of the political process? This question has at least two dimensions.
First, what kind of instruments are likely to be used to improve environmen-
tal quality?5 Second, why are some environmental eﬀects regulated more
vigorously than others?6 For this kind of application, we interpret our model
more broadly. Though we formulate the most specific version of our model
as a game between industry lobbies resisting environmental taxes, most of
our results also hold for a more general reduced form. In the more general
interpretation, the environmental regulation can take the form of a standard
3http://www.bdi-online.de
4On a related note, Aidt (1997) argues that, in the context of endogenous trade policy,
centralized cooperation of lobbies can overcome externality problems. Such problems have
been shown to lead to ineﬃcient lobbying equilibria in a non-cooperative setting by Magee
et al. (1989), implying excessive protectionism.
5A large literature investigates this question. For surveys, see Keohane et al. (2000)
and Dijkstra (1999).
6For instance, why have emissions such as lead, carbon monoxide, NOx and many water
pollutants been eliminated or reduced successfully in many industrial countries, whereas
in other policy areas (CO2, benzene, noise, species extinction) very little has changed
despite considerable public attention?
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rather than a tax.7 Also, lobbies need not necessarily be representatives of
diﬀerent industries. Each “lobby” could, for instance, correspond to an indi-
vidual firm. We would then speak of loophole lobbying when firms seek more
lenient treatment than other firms within the same industry. General lob-
bying would then refer to activities directed against regulation of the entire
industry.8
In such a more general interpretation, we can compare how lobbying be-
havior is likely to depend on the problem under consideration. For instance,
we can compare the lobbying behavior of a group of industry associations
facing an eco tax with the lobbying behavior of a group of automobile firms
facing highway speed regulation. For automobile firms as the anti-regulation
lobbyists, there is little scope for loophole lobbying. A speed limit may be
more or less rigid, but that is about as far as regulatory flexibility goes:
An individual exemption from speed limits for Audi, BMW, Mercedes or
Porsche would be inconceivable, so loophole lobbying in this area cannot
achieve much. Thus, if firms spend eﬀort on lobbying, it must necessarily be
directed towards preventing regulation as such rather than towards obtaining
loopholes. Even though general lobbying is still subject to free riding, this
problem is mitigated by the absence of the alternative, loophole lobbying.9 It
is therefore not surprising that lobbying of the German auto industry against
7See Polk and Schmutzler (2003) for details.
8Also, one could consider cases where loophole lobbying is not directed at obtaining
exemptions from some general regulation; it could also be about resisting specific reg-
ulations that only aﬀect the particular lobbyist’s group. In Germany, for instance, the
food industry association BVE has engaged in campaigns against a mandatory deposit
on beverage cans, against mandatory consumer information on food quality, and in favor
of a more liberal treatment of genetic food.(see http://www.bve.de). The auto industry
organisation VdA resisted a charge on heavy vehicles, highway speed regulations, and an
obligation to take back old cars (see http://www.vda.de).
9Even so, some firms might prefer to devote less eﬀort to general lobbying against speed
regulation than others, simply because they have less to gain. All we are saying is that the
members of the group of firms that do have strong preferences against speed regulation
are compelled to resist the regulation as such rather than lobby for loopholes.
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speed restrictions has been highly successful.10
Another application concerns the principle that emission standards must
be non-discriminatory rather than diﬀerentiating across firms. By familiar
textbook arguments, diﬀerentiation of standards has eﬃciency advantages
similar to those of taxes or tradeable permits: By diﬀerentiating standards
so as to equate the marginal costs of abatement, the total costs of achieving a
target level of emissions can in principle be minimized. We suggest that, nev-
ertheless, firms may prefer a legal environment where diﬀerentiated standards
are prohibited: Without such diﬀerentiation, firms are aware that the only
way to secure high emissions standards for themselves is to work towards the
common goal of a lax uniform standard. If diﬀerentiation is allowed, there is
scope for loophole lobbying, which distracts them from focussing on resisting
regulation as such.
Though there is a considerable literature on endogenous environmental
policy,11 we are not aware of any paper on multi-dimensional lobbying against
environmental regulation. However, Rodrik (1986) notes the asymmetry be-
tween tariﬀs and production subsidies that, from the perspective of firms in
import-competing industries, the former are public goods, whereas the latter
are not. Therefore, lobbying for tariﬀs and lobbying for subsidies correspond
to our concepts of general lobbying and private lobbying, respectively.12 Fi-
nally, the particular aspect of our model that the Nash equilibria of lobbying
games may be ineﬃcient for the interest groups under consideration has re-
ceived considerable attention (see e.g. Magee et al., 1989).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our general frame-
10We have little to say about why speed regulation was lax in Germany, but not in
other countries. The composition of the German car industry and the resulting strength
of lobbying incentives provide a likely (but trivial) explanation. Our approach allows the
less trivial comparison of lobbying outcomes in situations without substantial diﬀerences
in lobbying incentives.
11See Hahn (1990), Fredriksson (1997), Aidt (1998), Damania (1999).
12Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002) also analyze the choice between diﬀerent types of
lobbying activities. There, however, the lobbies choose between informational lobbying
and contribution payments rather than general and loophole lobbying.
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work. Section 3 presents comparative statics results under the assumption of
a binding budget constraint. Section 4 extends the analysis to an unlimited
budget. Section 5 concludes.
2 The framework
2.1 General assumptions
We analyze a game between two lobby groups i = 1, 2 where each group
represents a polluting industry. Both industries are imperfectly competitive.
For simplicity, firms in an industry have constant and identical marginal costs
ci. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Industry profits are a decreasing and convex function of
marginal costs.
The property of decreasing profits is very general.13
Marginal costs are aﬀected by environmental policy towards industry i,
which, for simplicity, is given by a tax ti. Thus, if the pre-tax level of marginal
costs is c, after-tax levels are c+ ti. Groups can lobby to influence environ-
mental policy. The tax ti for industry i depends on the overall tax level t
and an industry-specific loophole li. To influence the overall tax, industries
can engage in general lobbying. The amount spent on such activities by in-
dustry i is gi ≥ 0. The total tax level is a function of the total general
13The convexity property also holds in many circumstances, including the linear
monopoly and the standard static linear oligopoly models: For instance, in the linear
monopoly model with demand x = a − p, the second derivative of profits with respect
to costs is 1/2 > 0. Oligopoly examples include diﬀerentiated Bertrand and Cournot
models as well as competition on the line. For a related discussion on the convexity of
individual firm profits, see Athey and Schmutzler (2001). Industries with lower costs have
high output and mark-up; for those industries the additional increase in mark-up result-
ing from further cost reductions is more valuable as it applies to a greater output, and,
conversely, the additional increase in output is more valuable as the mark-up earned on
each additional unit is higher.
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lobbying eﬀort, g ≡ g1+g2. General lobbying eﬀorts of both groups are thus
perfect substitutes, so that groups provide a public good through general
lobbying.14 To influence the loophole, industries engage in loophole lobbying,
pi ≥ 0, which, by definition, increases only the individual loophole. On the
other hand, loophole lobbying of the competing group tends to reduce the
own loophole.15
We also assume decreasing returns to lobbying. Summing up:
Assumption 2 The industry-specific tax ti is a function T i =
T i (t (g) , li (pi, pj)) such that for i = 1, 2, j 6= i
∂T i
∂t
≥ 0; tii ≡
∂T i
∂li
≤ 0; tg ≡
dt
dg
≤ 0; lii ≡
∂li
∂pi
≥ 0; (1)
lij ≡
∂li
∂pj
≤ 0; tgg ≡
∂t2
(∂g)2
≥ 0; liii =
∂2li
(∂pi)2
≤ 0
Industry profits, gross of lobbying costs, are therefore
Πi
¡
pi, pj, g
¢
= πi
¡
c+ T i
¡
t (g) , li
¡
pi, pj
¢¢¢
. (2)
We consider two specifications of the tax function. For additive tax functions,
T i(t, li) = ti = t− li.16
For multiplicative tax functions,
T i(t, li) = ti = t
¡
1− li
¢
, where li ∈ [0, 1] .
In the former case, a loophole is interpreted as an absolute reduction in the
tax level; in the latter case, it corresponds to a percentage reduction. Neither
case appears more or less plausible on a priori grounds. As we shall see, some
results will hold for both cases, whereas for others, the strategic eﬀects diﬀer
for additive and multiplicative functions.
We introduce the following measure of the eﬀectivity of loophole lobbying.
14Obviously, general lobbying is only a public good for the set of firms, not for other
groups of society.
15Intuitively, groups compete for favors by legislators. If the competing group j spends
much on loophole lobbying, group i will have to exert more eﬀort to obtain such favors.
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Definition 1 θ ∈ < parameterizes the eﬀectivity of loophole lobbying if it
enters the function li and satisfies the following properties:
∂li
∂θ
≥ 0; ∂
2li
∂pi∂θ
> 0 for i = 1, 2;
∂2li
∂pj∂θ
≤ 0 for i = 1, 2, j 6= i. (3)
Our preferred interpretation of θ is that discussed in the introduction: In
some situations, there is less scope for loopholes than in others because the
regulator has little flexibility in the design of the instruments. Such cases
are characterized by a low θ, whereas θ is high when regulatory flexibility is
high.
3 Binding budget constraints
In this section, we assume that the budget of each lobby has a fixed size,
which we normalize to one, so that pi = 1−gi. This assumption is more than
just a convenient simplification: In some contexts, the budget will be hard
to change. An industry lobby finances its campaigns from the contributions
of its members, which, at least in the short term may be fixed. We thus
consider the game with pi ∈ [0, 1] and objective functions
eπi ¡pi, pj; θ¢ = πi ¡c+ T i ¡t ¡2− pi − pj¢− li ¡pi, pj; θ¢¢¢ .
We are interested in comparative statics with respect to the eﬀectiveness
parameter θ. To carry out these comparative statics and to guarantee local
stability, we introduce the next assumption.
Assumption 3 eπi (pi, pj; θ) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with respect
to all variables and satisfies eπiii < 0, and eπiiieπjjj − eπiijeπjji > 0.17
This game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, (p1∗, p
2
∗). For an
interior equilibrium, straightforward calculations yield:
dpi
dθ
=
−eπiiθeπjjj + eπjjθeπiijeπiiieπjjj − eπiijeπjji (4)
17For both types of tax functions, the condition that eπiii < 0 is an implication of (1).
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dgi
dθ
=
dpi
dθ
(5)
Intuitively, a higher θ should increase loophole lobbying: Simple calcula-
tions show that Assumption 2 and Definition 1 imply that eπiiθ ≥ 0 for both
specifications of the tax function.18 Thus, a higher θ increases the marginal
returns to increasing pi, so that, other things equal, more loophole lobby-
ing should result. The following proposition confirms this intuition, using a
symmetry assumption.
Proposition 1 Suppose both lobbies have identical payoﬀ functions. If the
equilibrium is symmetric before and after an increase in θ, loophole lobbying
must increase with θ.
Proof. (i) Suppose loophole lobbying eﬀorts are strategic complements
at the equilibrium (eπiij ≥ 0). The result then follows directly from (4) and
(5), using eπiiθ ≥ 0 and eπiii ≤ 0 by concavity.
(ii) Now suppose lobbying eﬀorts are strategic substitutes at the equilib-
rium (eπiij ≤ 0). Denote the equilibrium for the initial parameter value θ∗ as
(p1∗, p
2
∗) = (p∗, p∗). Then
∂πi
∂pi (p
1
∗, p
2
∗; θ∗) = 0 for i = 1, 2. As θ∗ increases to
θ∗∗, ∂π
i
∂pi (p∗, p∗, θ∗∗) > 0, because eπiiθ ≥ 0. Now suppose the new equilibrium
p1∗∗ = p
2
∗∗ = p∗∗ satisfies p∗∗ < p∗. Then, by concavity of π
i in pi and eπiij ≤ 0,
∂πi
∂pi
(p∗∗, p∗∗, θ∗∗) ≥
∂πi
∂pi
(p∗, p∗, θ∗∗) > 0,
so that the first-order condition for an equilibrium is violated at p∗∗.
The intuition depends on whether loophole lobbying eﬀorts are strategic
complements or strategic substitutes. Under the assumptions made so far,
both cases are possible.19 With strategic complements, the direct eﬀects of θ
18Using the envelope theorem, eπiiθ = −πicliiθ for additive tax functions, whereas eπiiθ =
−πicctgliθlii − πicliiθt for multiplicative tax functions.
19For the additive tax function, eπiij = πic ¡tgg − liij¢ > 0 if and only if tgg − liij < 0. As
tgg > 0, loophole lobbying activities will only be strategic complements in eπiij if they are
suﬃciently strong complements in li, i.e., liij is positive and suﬃciently large.
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on p1 and p2 are mutually reinforcing: The direct eﬀect of θ on p1 induces a
positive eﬀect on p2 and vice versa. With strategic substitutes, the indirect
eﬀects of loophole lobbying are more complex: an increase in loophole lobby-
ing by one industry induces decreasing loophole lobbying by the other one.
Thus, the positive direct eﬀects of θ on p1 and p2 tend to oﬀset each other.
However, under the symmetry assumption the direct eﬀect dominates. Thus,
as the eﬀectivity of loophole lobbying increases, groups engage in more loop-
hole lobbying under the symmetry condition.20 Through this strategic eﬀect,
an increase in the eﬀectiveness of loophole lobbying benefits the environment:
Proposition 2 With fixed budgets, emissions decrease with θ for symmetric
equilibria if liθ is suﬃciently small at the equilibrium.
To understand this result, write equilibrium lobbying eﬀorts as p∗ (θ) and
define the individual equilibrium tax level for each industry i as
T ∗ (θ) ≡ T
¡
t∗ (2− 2p∗ (θ)) , li (p∗ (θ) , p∗ (θ) , θ)
¢
.
Emissions are decreasing in θ if the following expression is negative:21
dT ∗
dθ
=
∂T
∂li
lijp
∗
θ −
∂T
∂t
t∗gp
∗
θ +
∂T
∂li
liθ.
The last term on the right-hand-side reflects the direct eﬀect of higher θ on
loopholes and taxes: absent any behavioral changes, taxes fall as θ increases.
The remaining terms capture the strategic eﬀects of the increase in loophole
lobbying (p∗θ > 0). These strategic eﬀects work towards an increase of taxes.
∂T
∂li l
i
jp
∗
θ is non-positive, capturing the negative eﬀect of increasing loophole
lobbying on opponent loopholes as lij ≤ 0. Then consider −∂T∂t t∗gp∗θ. Because
20Potentially, the indirect eﬀect may lead to a reduction in loophole lobbying by one
industry. However, such a counterintuitive result requires substantial asymmetries between
lobby groups; see Polk and Schmutzler (2003) for details. There, we also show that, for
asymmetric groups, at least one group increases loophole lobbying.
21The calculation uses the envelope theorem; which guarantees that an additonal term³
∂T
∂li l
i
i − ∂T∂t tg
´
p∗θ cancels out.
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of the fixed budget, more loophole lobbying means less general lobbying,
which increases taxes for both industries. Again, this increases taxes.
The net eﬀect of a change of θ on taxes consists of the direct eﬀect, ∂T∂li l
i
θ,
which is beneficial for industries, and the increasing negative externalities
that groups exert on each other. Clearly, if the direct eﬀect is very strong,
higher θ and lower taxes will coincide. Whenever the indirect eﬀects domi-
nate, however, taxes will increase as groups engage more heavily in loophole
lobbying.22
Proposition 2 is our central result for the fixed budget case. It indicates
that an increasing importance of loopholes tends to be beneficial for the
environment, at least in a symmetric situation. If lobbying becomes more
important, industries focus on lobbying activities that tend to be ineﬀective.23
4 Unlimited budgets
4.1 Generalities
With an unlimited budget, an increase in loophole lobbying no longer de-
creases general lobbying automatically: In principle, industries can increase
both types of lobbying when θ rises. Therefore, we do not obtain straightfor-
ward comparative statics results without further restrictions. Nevertheless,
we can gain considerable insight into the strategic interactions.
With unlimited budgets, (pi, gi) can be chosen from [0,∞) × [0,∞). 24
22Note that, in dT
∗
dθ , p
∗
θ can be substituted for using (4). Doing so, clarifies in particular,
that a small value of liθ does not automatically imply a small value of p
∗
θ.
23In Polk and Schmutzler (2003), we showed that the above results also hold when the
instrument under consideration is a pollution standard rather than a tax.
24As long as there is an upper bound B to the industry profit for arbitrary lobbying
choices, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
¡
p1∗, p
2
∗, g
1
∗, g
2
∗,
¢
of the game exists. Strategies
with pi + gi > B are strictly dominated, so that, to find a Nash equilibrium, one can
assume compact strategy spaces and the proof follows from Prop. 8.D.3 in Mas-Colell et
al. (1995).
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Further, for simplicity, we apply the following symmetry restriction:
π1 = π2 ≡ π; l1 = l2 ≡ l; p1∗ = p2∗; g1∗ = g2∗. (SR)
In Appendix 7.1, we use (SR) to derive the formulas for dp
i∗
dθ and
dgi∗
dθ
((8) and (9)). We now apply these formulas to show that there are no sub-
stantial diﬀerences between additive and multiplicative tax functions. We
shall confine ourselves to the results and the intuition; the proofs are in the
appendix.
4.2 Additive tax functions
4.2.1 Single player decisions
The eﬀects of increasing θ on one industry for given behavior of the other
one are unambiguous for additive tax functions.
Proposition 3 For unlimited budget and additive tax functions, the best re-
sponses pi (pj, gj; θ) and gi (pj, gj; θ) are increasing in θ for j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.1.
The intuition has three ingredients. First, the marginal benefit from
increasing loophole lobbying, Πipi , is increasing in θ (Π
i
piθ > 0). This is so for
two reasons. Most obviously, higher θ increases the eﬀectiveness lii of loophole
lobbying at generating loopholes. Thus, the cost reduction from increasing pi
becomes larger as θ increases. In addition, as the profit function πi is convex
in ci, the value of a cost reduction of any given size is higher the lower costs
initially are. In particular, because costs are low if θ is high (liθ > 0), any
further cost reduction from loophole lobbying is more valuable the higher
θ is. Second, the marginal benefit from increasing general lobbying, Πigi , is
increasing in θ ((Πigiθ > 0)). Again, this reflects the convexity of profits
in marginal costs: As liθ > 0, costs are low when θ is high. Reducing them
further by carrying out general lobbying is therefore more valuable. Third, for
additive functions, general lobbying and loophole lobbying are complements
12
in the objective function of each lobby (Πipigi ≥ 0). Again, this follows from
the convexity argument: The higher general lobbying (and therefore the lower
the tax), the higher the gain from the additional tax reduction that comes
from loophole lobbying.
Combining these three ingredients, we find that higher θ has direct pos-
itive eﬀects on general and loophole lobbying, and that these eﬀects are
mutually reinforcing. Thus, for fixed behavior of the other group, a lobby will
increase both types of expenditures.
4.2.2 Strategic interaction
To understand the strategic interactions between players, we need to know
how changes in one group’s action aﬀect the other group’s lobbying returns.
Proposition 4 For additive tax functions and unlimited budgets, i, j = 1, 2
and i 6= j :
(i) Πipigj ≥ 0 (ii) Πigigj ≤ 0 (iii) Πigipj ≤ 0
(iv) Πipipj is ambiguous; but Π
i
pipj < 0 if l
i
ij < 0.
Results (i) and (ii) are analogous to the earlier result that Πipigi ≥ 0 and
the concavity requirement that Πigigi ≤ 0.25 Intuitively, (iii) follows because
higher loophole lobbying of the competitor reduces the own loophole and thus
increases own costs. The value of the cost reduction from general lobbying
(tg) is thus reduced by convexity of πi (ci). As to (iv), higher loophole lob-
bying of j increases i’s marginal costs
¡
lij < 0
¢
and thus decreases incentives
for cost reduction from general lobbying by convexity of πi (ci). As long as
liij < 0, lobbying is also less eﬀective when the competitor engages in more
private lobbying, reinforcing the idea that lobbying decisions are strategic
substitutes. On the other hand, the precise nature of the loophole function
li (pi, pj; θ) depends on unmodeled aspects of the political process, so that we
are reluctant to claim that the sign of liij is necessarily negative.
25gi and gj enter Πi only via g = gi + gj , so that Πipigj = Π
i
pigi and Π
i
gigi = Π
i
gigj .
13
Figure 1 summarizes our findings for additive tax functions. The con-
nected lines correspond to positive interactions (complementarities between
the variables); dashed lines correspond to negative interactions.
 
 
 
           θ  
 
 
                              
    1p                2p  
 
 
 
 
 
   1g      2g  
 
Figure 1: Interactions between lobbying decisions — the additive case
4.2.3 Comparative statics results
For additive tax functions, the result that loophole lobbying crowds out gen-
eral lobbying breaks down quite generally.
Proposition 5 (i) Consider the unlimited budget case with additive lobbying
functions. Under symmetry, the equilibrium levels of general lobbying and
loophole lobbying move into the same direction as θ increases.
(ii) Suppose further that Πipipj < 0 or Π
i
pipj <
¯¯¯
Πipipi
¯¯¯
. Then general lobbying
and loophole lobbying both increase as a result of the increase in θ.
The proposition reflects the idea that general lobbying and loophole lob-
bying are complementary activities in the objective function of each industry
14
(see Subsection 4.2.1).26 The additional condition in (ii) ensures that strate-
gic eﬀects do not undermine this intuition.
4.3 Multiplicative tax functions
4.3.1 Single player decisions
For multiplicative tax functions, increasing θ has less straightforward eﬀects,
unless αi ≡ −πicπicc is large. This requirement has a particularly transparent
interpretation if the industries are monopolies with linear demand functions
x = a − p. Then αi = a − ci is the standard market size parameter.27 As
Appendix 7.3.1 shows, large αi is also consistent with the required second
order conditions.
Proposition 6 For multiplicative taxes, if αi > (1− li) t, pi (pj , gj; θ) is
increasing in θ and gi (pj, gj; θ) is decreasing in θ for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
The result shows that, as for the binding budget constraint, loophole
lobbying crowds out general lobbying, at least for a large αi. Intuitively,
the result follows if Πipiθ ≥ 0, Πigiθ ≤ 0 and Πipigi ≤ 0: By Πipiθ ≥ 0, the
direct eﬀect of a higher θ is an increase in pi and a reduction in gi. With
Πipigi ≤ 0, higher loophole lobbying makes general lobbying less attractive,
and vice versa. Thus, the positive eﬀect of θ on pi and the negative eﬀect on
gi are mutually reinforcing.
However, while Πipiθ ≥ 0 holds by definition, Πigiθ > 0 and Πipigi > 0 are
both possible if we do not impose the restriction on αi. In both cases, this
reflects convexity of πi(ci).28 Nevertheless, there are forces towards Πigiθ ≤ 0
and Πipigi ≤ 0: As to Πigiθ, high θ corresponds to large loopholes by liθ > 0,
26The additional condition in part (ii) is fairly weak. For instance, from Proposition
4, Πipipj < 0 for l
i
ij < 0. The weaker requirement that Π
i
pipj <
¯¯¯
Πipipi
¯¯¯
still holds when
lii <
¯¯
lij
¯¯
and
¯¯
liii
¯¯
< liij .
27Recall that, for linear monopolies, π (ci) = (a− ci)2 /4.
28If θ or pi increases, costs fall. This increases the value of further cost reductions from
increasing gi.
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so that the tax reduction from increasing general lobbying is relatively low.
As to Πipigi ≤ 0, for industries that engage heavily in loophole lobbying and
therefore have large loopholes, the eﬀect of general lobbying on ti is small.
In Appendix 7.3.2, we show that, in spite of the potential countereﬀects,
Πigiθ ≤ 0 and Πipigi ≤ 0 if αi > (1− li) t.
4.3.2 Strategic interactions
Again, we summarize our observations on the relevant second derivatives.
Proposition 7 Πipipj ,Π
i
gipj and Π
i
pigj have ambiguous signs. If α
i is suﬃ-
ciently large, Πigipj ≥ 0 and Πipigj ≤ 0. If, in addition, liij < 0, then Πipipj < 0.
We confine ourselves to identifying the sources of ambiguity; details are
given in the Appendix.
(i) Πipipj : Cost reductions from loophole lobbying of any given size are
worth less when costs are high (for instance, because of intense lobbying by
the competitor). However, unless liij < 0, the size of the cost reduction will
be higher when competing lobbies lobby more intensively.
(ii) Πigipj : Increases in loophole lobbying of the competitor reduce the
own loophole and therefore increase the eﬀect of general lobbying on the net
tax t (1− li). However, by the convexity argument, higher loophole lobbying
of competitors increases own costs and thus reduces the gains from cost
reductions of any given size.
(iii) Πipigj : This corresponds to the discussion of Π
i
pigi in Section 4.3.1.
Figure 2 summarizes Proposition 7, if αi is large and liij < 0.
29 The figure
illustrates that the direct positive eﬀects of increasing θ on loophole lobbying
induce negative eﬀects on general lobbying of both players.
29The interpretation of the lines is analogous to Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Interactions between lobbying decisions — the multiplicative case
4.3.3 Comparative statics
The crowding-out result holds under reasonable conditions.
Proposition 8 Suppose that Πigiθ ≤ 0,Πipipj ≤ 0 and
¯¯¯
Πigipj
¯¯¯
≤ Πigipi. Then,
for multiplicative tax functions, loophole lobbying increases and general lob-
bying decreases as θ increases.
The condition
¯¯¯
Πigipj
¯¯¯
≤ Πigipi is extremely weak: It holds as long as
lii >
¯¯
lij
¯¯
at the equilibrium, that is, own lobbying has a stronger eﬀect on
loopholes than the other industry’s lobbying.
Crucially, the two types of lobbying are complements for additive tax
functions, but substitutes for multiplicative tax functions. Thus, general lob-
bying and loophole lobbying tend to move together for additive tax functions,
whereas they move in diﬀerent directions for multiplicative tax functions.
4.3.4 Eﬀects on emissions
We now ask under which circumstances an increase in θ increases taxes and
thereby decreases pollution. Taxes will fall when general lobbying and loop-
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hole lobbying both increase, which tends to be true for additive tax functions.
We therefore confine ourselves to multiplicative tax functions where increases
of loophole lobbying and decreases in general lobbying often coincide. We
obtain the following simple condition for a decrease in emissions.
Proposition 9 Denote the symmetric equilibrium lobbying eﬀorts as p (θ)
and g (θ), respectively. Then taxes for each industry are an increasing func-
tion T (θ) of θ if (2gθ + pθ) lii + l
i
jpθ + l
i
θ < 0.
As in Section 3, emissions can only be increasing if liθ is not to large.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that when environmental regulation can be carried out in
ways that have diﬀerent distributional implications for aﬀected groups, the
outcome may be stricter regulation. In such situations, groups place greater
emphasis on loophole lobbying than on general lobbying. If the lobbyists face
a binding budget constraint, an increase in loophole lobbying reduces general
lobbying, the net eﬀect of which is a reduction in emissions. The results are
less clear-cut for unlimited budgets, but under reasonable conditions loophole
lobbying can still crowd out general lobbying.
There is a caveat to our argument. We have focussed entirely on distri-
butional concerns among anti-environmental lobbies. Symmetric issues arise
with pro-environmental lobbies. Environmental lobbies will favor environ-
mental regulations but may disagree on the type. For instance, suppose two
industries operate in diﬀerent regions that produce global pollutants, so that
the positive eﬀects of environmental policy aﬀect the regions in the same way.
Suppose, however, that each region bears the costs of local pollution reduc-
tion. Suppose further that there is one environmental lobby in each region.
Then, though both lobbies want global pollution reduction, they prefer the
reduction to take place in the other region.30 Thus, regional environmental
30This assumes that local environmental groups also care about the economic well being
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lobbies might reduce general lobbying for environmental policy, because they
also put some eﬀort into lobbying for letting the other region bear a greater
part of the costs of pollution reduction.31
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7 Appendix: Unlimited budgets
7.1 Generalities
The first-order conditions for maximizing (2), net of lobbying costs, is
πic
∂T i
∂li
lii = 1 = π
i
c
∂T i
∂t
tg. (6)
The second-order conditions are:
πipipi ≤ 0;πigigi ≤ 0;πipipiπigigi −
¡
πigipi
¢2 ≥ 0. (7)
(SR) implies:
Π1p1p2 = Π
2
p2p1 ; Π
1
g1p2 = Π
2
g2p1 ; Π
1
g1g1 = Π
1
g1g2 = Π
2
g2g1 = Π
2
g2g2
Π1g1p1 = Π
1
p1g2 = Π
1
p1g2 = Π
2
p2g1 = Π
2
p2g2 = Π
2
g2p2; Π
1
p1θ = Π
2
p2θ; Π
1
g1θ = Π
2
g2θ
of their own region to some extent. See also the distinction in Hillman and Ursprung
(1994) regarding “greens” and “supergreens”.
31Although our model is formulated as a lobbying game against environmental regula-
tion, the general idea is potentially relevant for policy games where interest groups have
a common aim but compete regarding the distribution of benefits. Such situations also
arise with respect to output taxation in general and to redistribution among the members
of federal states.
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Using these conditions together with the implicit function theorem,
dpi∗
dθ
=
ΠigigiΠ
i
piθ −ΠigiθΠipigi³
Πipigi
´2
+ΠipigiΠ
i
gipj −ΠigigiΠipipi −ΠigigiΠipipj
(8)
dgi∗
dθ
=
1
2
ΠipipiΠ
i
giθ +Π
i
pipjΠ
i
giθ −ΠipiθΠipigi −ΠipiθΠigipj³
Πipigi
´2
+ΠipigiΠ
i
gipj −ΠigigiΠipipi −ΠigigiΠipipj
(9)
7.2 Additive tax functions
7.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Straightforward calculations show that
Πipiθ = −πicliiθ + πiccliθlii ≥ 0; Πigiθ = −πiccliθtg ≥ 0; Πipigi = −πicctglii ≥ 0 (10)
Thus, Πi is supermodular in pi, gi and has increasing diﬀerences in (pi, gi; θ).
By Proposition 5 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990), the optimal values of pi
and gi are therefore increasing in θ.
7.2.2 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) and (ii) follow from Πipigi ≥ 0 (condition (10)) and the second order
condition Πigigi ≤ 0 . (iii) follows from
Πigipj = −πicclijtg.
(iv) uses
Πipipj = −πicliij + πicclijlii.
7.2.3 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) At the equilibrium (p1∗, p
2
∗, g
1
∗, g
2
∗) = (p∗, p∗, g∗, g∗) for θ = θ∗,
∂πi
∂pi = 0.
Because Πipiθ ≥ 0 and Πigiθ ≥ 0, ∂π
i
∂pi > 0 and
∂πi
∂gi > 0 for (p∗, p∗, g∗, g∗) if
θ = θ∗∗ > θ∗. Now suppose the equilibrium level of pi corresponding to θ∗∗
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is p∗∗ < p∗. Then, from Πipipi < 0 and Π
i
pipj < 0,
∂πi
∂pi > 0 for (p∗∗, p∗∗, g∗, g∗)
if θ = θ∗∗. Now suppose further that g∗∗ > g∗. Then using Πipig > 0,
∂πi
∂pi > 0
for (p∗∗, p∗∗, g∗∗, g∗∗) if θ = θ∗∗, contradicting the best-response condition.
(ii) The numerator of (8) is negative. Using (7), (10) and the additional con-
dition in (ii), the denominator is also negative. Therefore loophole lobbying
increases. By (i), general lobbying also increases.
7.3 Multiplicative tax functions
7.3.1 Preliminaries
For multiplicative tax functions, (6) implies that
tlii = −
¡
1− li
¢
tg. (11)
Using this condition, (7) becomes
− πictliii + πicc
¡
tlii
¢2 ≤ 0; πictgg ¡1− li¢+ πicc ¡tlii¢2 ≤ 0³
−πicc
¡
tlii
¢2
+ πictgl
i
i
´2
≤
³
−πictliii + πicc
¡
tlii
¢2´³
πictgg
¡
1− li
¢
+ πicc
¡
tlii
¢2´
.
The first two second-order conditions hold when αi is suﬃciently large.
7.3.2 Proof of proposition 6
(i) Πipiθ ≥ 0 still holds, as
Πipiθ = −πictliiθ + πiccliθt2lii. (12)
(ii) Πigiθ can be positive or negative:
Πigiθ = −πictgliθ − πicct · liθ · tg
¡
1− li
¢
(13)
The first term is negative; the second term is positive. From (11),
Πigiθ =
πictl
i
il
i
θ
(1− li) + π
i
cct
2liil
i
θ (14)
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Hence, Πigiθ < 0 if and only if α
i > (1− li) t.
(iii) Next,
Πipigi = −πictglii − πicc
¡
tg
¡
1− li
¢
tlii
¢
. (15)
The first term is negative; the second term is positive. Similar arguments as
in (ii) show that Πipigi < 0 if α
i > (1− li) · t.
Therefore, if αi > (1− li) t, Πigiθ ≤ 0, Πipigi ≤ 0 and Πipiθ ≥ 0. Thus, Πi
is supermodular in pi and −gi and has increasing diﬀerences in (pi,−gi ; θ).
Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) now yields the result.
7.3.3 Proof of Proposition 7
The results follows from
(i) Πipipj = −πictliij + πicct2liilij
(ii) Πigipj = −πictglij − πicclijt (1− li) tg
(iii) Πipigj = Π
i
pigi .
7.3.4 Proof of Propositon 8
The proof follows directly from (8) and (9), using (7), Πipiθ ≥ 0;Πigipi ≤ 0
and the conditions of the proposition. The conditions Πigiθ < 0,Π
i
pipj ≤ 0
have already been shown to hold when αi is suﬃciently large and liij < 0.
7.3.5 Proof of Proposition 9
From T (θ) = t (2g (θ)) (1− li (p (θ) , p (θ) , θ)), we obtain:
dT
dθ
= 2tg
¡
1− li
¢
gθ − t
¡
liipθ + l
i
jpθ + l
i
θ
¢
.
Using (11) the statement immediately follows.
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